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Introduction
The most influential (Solomon, 2007) contribution to the literature on corporate governance is that made in a series of papers by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (see, for example, La Porta et al., 1996 Porta et al., , 1997a Porta et al., , 1998 Porta et al., , 2000 Porta et al., , 2002 Porta et al., , 2006 Porta et al., and 2008 Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . The extent of their contribution to the field of finance, in particular, is exceptional. According to "in-cites" ( (Keloharju, 2008) . Their key papers have influenced research across disciplinary boundaries being "some of the most-cited pieces in economics, finance, and law" (Siems, 2005) .
They investigated, in particular, relationships between legal traditions and corporate governance systems, especially with regard to differing levels of investor protection and their consequences. Their early papers (La Porta et al., 1997a and 1978) were based on the proposition that financial development was promoted by a legal system which protected outside investors against appropriation by insiders; and they viewed this argument, following Jensen and Meckling (1976) , as a natural consequence of a "contractual view of the firm" (La Porta et al., 2008) .
It is arguable that their work has contributed to a marginalization of the stakeholder approach to corporate governance; instead, discussion of the topic tends to be dominated by an agency theory perspective. Furthermore, their work has played a significant part in the development of a conventional wisdom that the "AngloAmerican" shareholder-value oriented form of corporate governance is the model to which other jurisdictions should conform (see, for example, La Porta et al., 2008; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Collison, 2003; Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001 ). Their statistical analysis has shown that the origin of a country's legal system, in particular whether it is based on a civil or common law tradition, is significantly associated with levels of investor protection, and the degree to which its capital markets are developed. They show that countries sharing a common law legal tradition (such as the UK, the US and the other developed English-speaking economies) have greater levels of investor protection, larger capital markets with more dispersed ownership, and a greater propensity for funds to be committed to new enterprises by external investors. In La Porta et al. (1998) they also draw on other literature to show that such phenomena are associated with greater economic growth. In more recent work however La Porta et al. (2008 ) noted, citing Glaeser at al. (2004 , that "the evidence on the relationship between institutions and aggregate growth more generally, which seemed substantial a few years ago, has been crumbling" (p.302). Notwithstanding this observation, the main edifice of the La Porta et al. work is regarded as robust by the authors: "our framework suggests that the common law approach to social control of economic life performs better than the civil law approach" (La Porta et al., 2008, p.327) .
In this paper we revisit some of the key statistical findings reported by La Porta et al. and reveal that the civil and common-law traditions also show statistically significant associations with various measures of societal well-being. We call into question the criteria used by La Porta et al. for assessing "poor" laws, by taking a broader perspective on a country's performance than the one based on financial and economic metrics. We also consider the differences between common and civil law to suggest a rationale for the results that we find, and for those reported by La Porta et al.; in particular we draw on arguments developed by Berle and Means regarding the provenance and implications of civil and common-law traditions. Our main focus in this paper is on two of the earlier La Porta at al. papers, especially La Porta et al. (1997a) and also La Porta et al. (1998) . Not only are these two of their most cited pieces of work, but the structure of the 1997 paper serves as a convenient basis for the statistical comparison that is at the heart of this paper. While our main focus is on the 1997 paper we will also adduce perspectives and more recent findings from their later work 1 especially La Porta et al. (2008) .
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section of the paper we outline relevant parts of the La Porta et al. work and consider evidence of their influence in the corporate governance literature. The subsequent section considers the relevance of social indicators as a method of assessing countries' well-being, and reports our analysis of certain indicators using the same method of country classification (i.e. one based on legal origin) as that used, in particular, by La Porta et al. (1996 , 1997a . In that section we reproduce material contained in La Porta et al. (1997a) . The penultimate section considers possible explanations for our findings based on the nature of the common and civil law legal traditions. The final section concludes.
Common and civil law legal traditions and the work of La Porta et al.
In the introduction to this paper, we suggested that the work of La Porta et al. lends itself to normative arguments in support of an approach to corporate governance based on a narrow agency theory perspective. This is consistent with the AngloAmerican, shareholder value-based model of capitalism as opposed to a stakeholder or social market-based approach. The "varieties of capitalism" literature (see, for example, Hall and Soskice, 2001; Dore, 2000 , Hutton, 1995 2003) is extensive and a substantive review of it would go beyond the scope of this paper. But it seems 1 As pointed out in the La Porta et al. body of work, especially La Porta et al. (2008) , some refinements have been made by the authors to the variables which they used in the 1997a and 1998 analysis. We think that it may be helpful if the figures which we quote from La Porta et al. (1997) are identifiable from that classic paper. Therefore in this paper we have reproduced some of the 1997 data as originally published; i.e. without adjustment for the subsequent refinements. We do not believe that updating La Porta et al.'s earlier data would have any bearing on the evidence and the arguments that we put forward in the current study.
apposite to note that, in their much cited work, Hall and Soskice (2001) take a "firmcentered" approach and regard "companies as the crucial actors in a capitalist economy" (p. 6). They apply micro level concepts to help understand the macro economy. Hall and Soskice draw a distinction between the two types of political economies, which they term respectively: liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. While they describe these ideal types as "poles of a spectrum" they broadly correspond to the classification used in this paper between Anglo
American and social market forms of capitalism. La Porta et al. (2008, p.303 ) cite the observation from Pistor (2006) that "all the liberal market economies in the OECD are common law countries, and all the coordinated ones are civil law ones." They then add "The literature on the variety of capitalisms has long looked for an objective measure of different types; perhaps it should have looked no further than legal origins."
We should emphasise that La Porta et al. do not themselves adversely compare the generic "stakeholder model" of capitalism with the "shareholder model"; at least they do not do so explicitly. It is a question on which they appear to be silent: certainly the term "stakeholder" does not appear in any of their papers which are cited above.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) do note "several important topics closely related to corporate governance that [their] article does not deal with" (p.740). These are "the foundations of contract theory", the "basic elements of the theory of the firm", "noncapitalist ownership patterns" (although they state that "we pay some attention to cooperatives") and certain functions of "financial intermediaries". Given this careful exclusion of "important topics" related to corporate governance their silence on stakeholders in conventionally owned firms is a rather deafening one.
In their widely cited survey of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) were very clear regarding their criteria for judging corporate governance:
"Our perspective on corporate governance is a straightforward agency perspective, sometimes referred to as separation of ownership and control. We want to know how investors get managers to give them back their money." (p.738).
They go on to make clear that they regard the principal question in relation to corporate governance systems as being not whether particular governance systems should be copied, but rather how external providers of finance can be provided with legal protection such that large-scale financing of entities can develop. They emphasise that this is not the case in many developing countries, nor in some "rich European countries" (p.738). Elsewhere in their paper they assert that "The fundamental question of corporate governance is how to assure financiers that they get a return on their financial investment." (p.773, emphasis added)
Shleifer and Vishny emphasised the absence of a basis on which to judge corporate governance models. For example, in relation to the United States, Germany and Japan, they state that "all these economies have the essential elements of a good corporate governance system", and that "the available evidence does not tell us which one of their governance systems is the best" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.739, emphasis in original) . The ensuing body of work from La Porta et al. does go on to develop a view of which system, based on levels of investor protection, is best, and that, as indicated above, turns out to be a common-law system (corresponding to the Anglo American version of capitalism).
La Porta et al. (1996 Porta et al. ( /1998 Porta et al. ( -hereafter 1998 2 ) investigated the legal rules offering protection to shareholders and creditors in 49 countries. They examined the origin of these countries' different legal systems, and the extent to which shareholders' and creditors' rights were enforced. Their basic classification of legal systems was twofold -those comprising common law with English origins and those based on civil law deriving from Roman law. They further classified the civil tradition countries (drawing on Reynolds and Flores, 1989) , into the "three major families":
French, German and Scandinavian legal traditions. They noted that English common law and the French and German varieties of civil law had spread to many other countries through a variety of mechanisms including colonialism and "more subtle imitation". The number of countries in each group was, respectively: 18 in the 2 La Porta et al. (1998) is the later (published) version of a working paper which appeared in 1996. The 1996 version is referred to in the 1997a paper, the latter being to an extent a development of it. The sequence of the La Porta et al. work may not be apparent unless this is made clear. As indicated in the text our main focus in the current paper is La Porta et al. (1997a) .
English origin group; 21 in the French origin group; six in the German origin group;
and four in the Scandinavian group.
Their investigation of legal regimes showed that common law countries generally offer stronger legal protection for investors than their civil law counterparts.
Amongst the civil law groupings the weakest legal protection for investors was found in the French civil law countries, with the German and Scandinavian civil law countries in between the French civil law and common law groups. Another key finding reported by La Porta et al. (1998) was that weaker investor protection is associated with more concentrated share ownership. Consequently, they hypothesized that stronger legal protection is likely to mean that a larger proportion of shares will be held in the form of minority holdings by diversified shareholders.
The latter hypothesis is supported by the findings reported in La Porta et al. (1997a) which show that countries with weaker investor protection have "smaller and narrower" capital markets for both equity and debt. They highlight the French civil law countries as having "both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets" (p. 1131) especially as compared with common law countries.
La Porta et al. acknowledge (1997a) relatively weak, and to assure family firms and the state a larger role in economic development?" They also speculate about whether "poor laws are just a proxy for an environment that is hostile to institutional development" and, drawing on evidence in La Porta et al. (1997b) , suggest that countries which have low levels of trust among their citizens have less effective institutions. In particular they wonder whether "some broad underlying factor, related to trust" may influence all institutions in a country including legal systems and capital markets 3 .
In La Porta et al. (1998) the authors also seek to place their findings in a wider context and pose "the ultimate question" of "whether countries with poor investor protections … actually do suffer (p. 1152). This question is partially answered by reference to work cited by King and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998) who found that "developed debt and equity markets contribute to economic growth". They also cited evidence from Levine (1998) In the next section we shall briefly discuss the development and use of social indicators and argue that they reveal a very different perspective on the relative performance of common and civil law countries from that put forward by La Porta et al.
Social indicators and an extension of the La Porta et al (1997) analysis
This section draws on the literature of social indicators and also on the insights of
Gray (2002) who suggested that social accounting may be "usefully thought of as the universe of all possible accountings". From that perspective, economic and financial indicators, whether micro or macro, may be characterized as very constrained subsets of a potentially much broader and informative social accounting.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, a 'social indicators movement' arose as a result of the perceived inadequacy of the information available to policy makers (Carley, 1981 ; see also Glatzer, 1981) . The suitability of macroeconomic metrics as indicators of societal welfare was increasingly questioned based on a growing body of research (see, for example, Christian, 1974; Galnoor, 1974; Goeke, 1974; Liu, 1974; Seashore, 1974) . The field of enquiry into social indicators burgeoned and the early 1970s saw the inception of the specialist journal, Social Indicators Research. Indeed, only a few years later, Glatzer (1981) stated that its "breadth and diversity" meant that "no one social scientist can hope to provide an adequate survey of the relevant literature." By 1976 the OECD had reported that:
"growth is not an end in itself, but rather an instrument for creating better conditions of life [and] increased attention must be given to the qualitative aspects of growth, and to the formulation of policies with respect to the broad economic and social choices involved in the allocation of growing resources" (OECD, 1976, p.7)
Examples of "macro" applications of social accounting are not numerous in the accounting literature but a small set of studies which explicitly considered macro social indicators appeared in a special section of Accounting Organizations and Society in 1981. The special section, which was introduced by Dierkes (1981) was "devoted to the memory" of a particular scholar, Raymond Bauer, who, anticipating
Gray's perceptions on social accounting, was a pioneer in the development of both social indicators and "corporate social accounting". In the special issue, Parke and Petersen (1981) addressed the potential of macro social indicators while Heard and
Bolce (1981) and Preston (1981) considered corporate social reporting. In Bauer (1966 ( , cited in Glatzer, 1981 ) the concept of social indicators was "elaborated for the first time" (Glatzer, 1981) although Glatzer points out that the same fundamental concepts had also received attention from the United Nations in the 1950s. In the current paper we report on a subset of the indicators published annually by the United Nations and, like La Porta et al., we consider the entity of interest to be the nation state.
Arguably the interest in social indicators, certainly as regards the developed economies, reached a high water mark in the 1970s, mirroring, to some extent, progressive developments in the field of accounting at that time (see for example, ASSC 1975; Burchell et al., 1985) . Soon afterwards, there were fundamental changes in the political climate (see, for example, Gray et al. (1995) and since then, at least within the "common law" countries, economic metrics have been "regnant" (Diener and Suh, 1997) as reflected, we would argue, in the criteria used by La Porta et al.
La Porta's 1997 analysis revisited with the legal and economic variables juxtaposed with social indicators
In this paper we have followed a similar pattern for the presentation of data to that used in La Porta et al. (1997) . In Table II of that paper (p. 1138), they listed 49 countries, grouped by legal origin, and reported empirical measures of financial and legal variables with means calculated for each legal origin. Our equivalent to Table II in La Porta et al. (1997a) is Table 2 below; it differs from the La Porta et al. Table II in three ways. Firstly we have added a number of social indicator variables. The social indicators comprise: the under five child mortality rate (U5MR 01-04); two separate measures of income inequality (R10/P10 and the Gini Index); the log of the prison population (Log Pr Pop); and the proportion of women in the lower, or a single, house of legislators (% Women MPs). These variables are defined in more detail in Table 1 Thirdly we have reported in Table 2 only a subset of the indicators from La Porta et al. (1997a) . The indicators reported are those from the first four columns of the La Porta et al. Table II and they measure various proxies for the vitality of equity markets and shareholder protection. This has been done to aid clarity of the exposition. The definitions of these variables are reproduced, in summary form, in Table 1 Panel B.
The rest of the financial/legal variables considered by La Porta et al. (1997a) are reproduced in an Annex to this paper (in "Supplement to Table 1B " and "Supplement to Table 2 ") and they are also included in statistical investigations which are appear later in the paper.
It is worth highlighting that La Porta et al. themselves investigated certain social indicators in one of their papers (La Porta et al., 1999) which assessed the "quality of government". They argued that the provision of high quality "public good provisions" which included infant mortality (referring to deaths under 12 months of age), "is a sign of a well functioning government" (La Porta et al., 1999, p.226) In the discussion of their results they state:
Compared to common law countries, French origin countries are sharply more interventionist (have higher top rates, less secure property rights, and worse regulation). ... French origin countries fall behind common law countries in public good provision: they have higher infant mortality, lower school attainment, higher illiteracy rates and lower infrastructure quality. (emphasis added) (La Porta et al.,1999, p. 261) La Porta et al. based their analysis of infant mortality on 196 observations meaning that they covered countries on both sides of the epidemiological transition, with a huge range of development levels, and extremes of per capita average incomes.
Indeed, the sizable and highly skewed range among infant mortality statistics was reflected in La Porta et al. using the log of that particular variable in their analysis.
Given the child mortality analysis in Collison et al. (2007) (for the years 2001-4); secondly, the discovery that "Anglo-American" countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and US) had higher levels of child mortality than any of the other 18 countries; and thirdly, the marked deterioration in the relative ranking of the "Anglo-American" countries among the 24 since 1960 when they had occupied upper and middle positions when the countries were ranked in order of increasing child mortality 6 .
5 The other OECD countries that were excluded from the Collison et al. study were the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia and Turkey. They were omitted since their per capita income levels were considerably lower than those of the other countries. While the cut-off point was to some extent arbitrary, it did allow a more 'like with like' comparison. Both income inequality, and child mortality featured in La Porta et al., (1999) , but no reference was made to the relationship between them. Thus, in setting out the terms of their analysis they stated that:
"As a first step, it is important to agree on what constitutes "good government." We use the term "good" in this article to stand for goodfor-economic-development. One can alternatively consider good government performance to manifest itself in lower inequality …., but here we keep the narrow view." (p.223) Given their laudable choice of child mortality as an indicator of good government the limitation of their "narrow view", which lies at the heart of our criticism, is ironically apparent.
The basis of the choice of the social indicators listed in Table 1 Panel A, merits some explanation. The results reported in Collison et al. (2007) highlighting the poor performance of the Anglo-American countries suggested the possibility of an underlying systemic relationship involving poor societal well-being which could be linked to income inequality.
The epidemiological literature provides additional evidence to support such a proposition (see, for example, Wilkinson and Pickett, 2008) . Two measures of income inequality were chosen and are explained in more detail in Table 1 . They are the widely used Gini coefficient which takes into account income levels across an entire population, and a second, more extreme, measure which is a ratio based only on the income received by the top and bottom deciles.
The child mortality and prison population variables were chosen as examples of indicators which previous research had shown to be related to income inequality. The percentage of women MPs was selected since it seemed to be a potential discriminator between common and civil law traditions; the former being identified with the preservation of established interests. It seemed plausible that such values could be manifested in various ways:
If the mechanics of a particular electoral system exclude to a large degree members of a particular ascriptive group (women or otherwise), then more often than not that is damning evidence that the system is excluding the interests of that particular group from the structures of decision-making power. ...Indeed, the degree to which a system successfully includes women can indicate a propensity for the system to include other disenfranchised minorities. (Reynolds, 1999, p. 549) Ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population (in millions) in 1994 source: emerging market fact book and world development report 1996 IPOs/pop Ratio of the number of initial public offerings of equity in a given country to its population (in millions) for the period July 1995 to June 1996. AntiDir Rights An index aggregating shareholder rights.
Note that the data reported in this table are not all from the same year as each other or as the data reported in the La Porta et al. (1997) (Collison et al., 2009 ). The differences in base year relative to the La Porta et al. (1997) study are arguably appropriate in principal since one could regard social indicators as being a lagging variable relative to economic indicators. However the broad structural differences in socio-economic variables between countries are arguably such that the ideal time differences for an examination such as this are moot. Furthermore we would not expect the figures and relationships under consideration to be very sensitive to such timing issues.
Table 2 External Capital Markets and Social Indicators
Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 1 Legal Porta et al., (1997a) The statistical The association of income inequality with a range of social ills is reflected in the consistent ranking of the legal origin groups across the income inequality, child mortality and prison population indicators. In each case the Scandinavian countries perform best, followed by the German group. The French group is consistently ranked third while the common law countries are consistently ranked at the bottom.
The final social indicator, percentage of women MPs, is of a different type to the others but, as discussed above may be considered as a proxy for the progression of the democratic impulse and so could be construed as having features in common with the other measures. This indicator again shows, we would argue, the worst performance being found amongst the common law countries (in aggregate) although admittedly, there appears to be little difference between the three non-Scandinavian groups.
Close inspection reveals that the results are influenced by a few outliers. In the German group, the Asian nations have low figures which may be accounted for by differing cultural traditions. Were these to be removed, a rather different gradation of means would be apparent. However the figures for France, Greece and Ireland are all also relatively low. A cultural/historical examination of possible explanations for these figures goes beyond the scope of this paper, but we would venture that, prima facie, the common law countries, in aggregate, seem to have progressed less far on the journey towards representative democracy and pluralism than their civil law counterparts.
The next part of this section presents a more rigorous statistical examination of the data in Table 2 (and the rest of the La Porta et al data which appears in the Annex to this paper) but it already appears that, compared to the civil law countries, the common-law tradition is associated with greater inequality and a relatively conservative approach to social development.
Statistical analysis
The empirical analysis in this section of the paper has a number of parts. Initially, the Table 2 suggested that the variables might not be normally distributed. In the top half of the table, the mean value of each social indicator together with its standard deviation is provided for all four legal traditions. An F-statistic and its pvalue are then reported for a test of the null hypothesis that these means were equal.
In the bottom half of the paper, median values and their associated Z-statistics are provided for each of the four groupings of countries and an H-statistic together with its p-value is shown for the null hypothesis that these median values were equal.
[ Table 3 about here]
An analysis of Table 3 A more detailed inspection of Table 3 reveals that there is some variability within the country groupings for the social indicator variables being studied. In particular, some of the standard deviation figures were large. This seems to be especially the case for Despite this variability within groupings, the picture that emerges from Table 3 Table 4 . Based on the results from [ Table 4 about here]
A visual inspection of Table 4 reveals that there is a strong negative association between: under-5 child mortality; income inequality; as well as the size of prison 8 The non-parametric Spearman rank correlation analysis was selected because there was some evidence that the variables being examined were not normally distributed. In fact, descriptive statistics revealed that data for one of the social indicators and six of the investor protection variables were positively skewed. In addition, there was some evidence of kurtosis in the data series. However, an analysis of the parametric Pearson correlation coefficients revealed very little difference in the values calculated.
population; and whether the legal origin of the countries being studied is based on Table 5 are not statistically different from zero at the 5 per cent level.
In the top half of (namely the protection of investor rights) within a country. All of these significant correlations had the expected signs. For example, it is not surprising that the correlation between ExCapGNP and Anti Dir is positive at 0.522 since one would expect the index value aggregating shareholders rights in a country to be high where the ratio of the capitalisation held be minorities to GNP to be high.
Since there is some evidence of a relationship among the investor protection variables from La Porta et al. studies, it was decided to use a statistical approach to take account of this correlation before examining the association between social indicators and the investor protection variables using regression analysis 9 .
To orthogonal to each other multicollinearity should not be present.
10 Table 5 summarises the results from applying PCA to the investor protection variables considered in the La Porta et al. papers. In particular, the bottom part of Table 5 details the eigenvalues and proportions of variance explained by the PCs, while the top part of Table 5 summarises the factor loadings for the dominant PCs. The data in Table 5 clearly shows that across all 20 countries examined, the bulk of the variability in the original 10 investor protection variables can be explained by 4 PCs. For example, the variance, or eigenvalue, of the first PC is 3.027. It explains 30.3 per cent of the total variance of the 10 investor protection variables. The second PC has an eigenvalue of 2.291 and accounts for 22.9 per cent of total variance of the 10 variables. The third and fourth PCs also have eigenvalues greater than 1.000 and explain 17.0 and 11.3 per cent and account for 17.0 an 11.3 per cent of the variability in the investor protection measures across the different countries. The proportion of 10 Factor analysis (FA) is a very similar technique to PCA and it could have been employed to identify the fundamental investor protection variables that are important in explaining the social indicator measures. The defining characteristic that distinguishes between the two techniques is that, with PCA, all the variability in an item is used in the analysis, while in FA, only the variability in an item that is common with other items is used. PCA was used to identify the important factors in this paper as it is the preferred method for data reduction, while FA is preferred when the objective of the analysis is to detect structure. In most cases, however, the two methods yield very similar results (Hill and Lewicki, 2006) . variance explained by the remaining 6 PCs is relatively low and their eigenvalues are all small.
[ Table 5 about here]
The Kaiser criterion was used to select the PCs which should be used as inputs for the regression analysis. The criterion recommends that only those PCs with eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1, should be retained (Kaiser 1960) . Jolliffe (1972) has suggested a cut-off point of 0.7. However, in this instance, Jolliffe's criterion results in the same number of components being retained as Kaiser's criterion of the eigenvalue being greater than or equal to 1 (Dunteman 1994). Therefore, the adoption of these criteria led to the retention of 4 PCs. Together, these four PCs account for 81.5 per cent of the variance in the investor protection variables. Therefore, the dimensionality of the dataset can be reduced from 10 to 4.
The values in top half of Table 5 indicate the factor loadings of the PCs that are identified from the data. In particular, the top half of the table therefore highlights the variables that have large coefficients of either sign in each PC vector 11 . The first PC, which is shown in column 2, has high positive correlations with AntiDir, Rule of Law and IPOsPop and negative correlations with GDP Growth as well as 1s1Vote. This PC primarily reflects strong shareholder rights and a vibrant new issue market; it is labelled "Outsider Capitalism" in the current analysis. The second PC shows large negative co-efficients for ExCapGNP, GDPGrowth and 1s1Vote and can be interpreted as small stock market/ low growth variable. We label this PC "Insider Capitalism" in the remainder of the paper. The largest co-efficients for the third PC are positive for FirmsPop and negative for GDP Growth as well as Debt/GNP. This can be interpreted as a large stock market/ low growth/low debt variable; as a result, we label this PC as the "Small Economy" variable. The fourth PC is mainly associated with strong "Creditor Rights".
11 PCA is subject to a number of limitations. One limitation of the method is that it can often be difficult to interpret the principal components. This situation typically arises when several variables in the PC vectors have large coefficients of either sign (Dunteman, 1994) . However, this limitation was not a concern in the current analysis as, in each market, the identity of the high loading variables in each PC vector was very clear. A second limitation of the technique is that the choice of how many PCs to extract for further analysis is subjective, although the PCs will explain most of the variation in the original factors; they may not be useful in explaining the dependant variable (Brooks 2002) . That is, and in terms of the current analysis, although the PCs will explain most of the variation in the original economic and fundamental factors, they may not be the most useful as explanations of emerging market share returns.
In the final part of the empirical analysis, the dominant PCs together with Legal
Origin variables are used as inputs to a regression analysis in order to explain the social indicator variables of the 22 developed countries included in this study 12 Table 6 suggests that a significant relationship exists between some of the social indicator measures and the PC as well as legal origin variables. The strongest and most significant associations are between under 5 child mortality as well as income inequality and legal origin variables. For example, the co-efficients for the legal origin 12 In fact, the regression results reported in this paper relate to data for 20 of the 22 countries since IPOsPop information was missing for Australia and Switzerland. However, imputing values for these two missing observations and thereby increasing the sample up to 22 countries does not alter either the PCA results of the regression findings. 13 A regression was also run where one dummy variable was added depending on whether the country had an English common law tradition (value = 1), or not (value = 0). In this instance, the dummy variable had the following co-efficients: 2.237 (p=0.000) for U5 01-04; 5.124 (p=0.038) for R10/P10; 10.498 (p=0.003) for the Gini Index; 0.256 (p=0.142) for Log PR Pop; for % Women MPs. 14 Although not shown in Table 6 , the VIFs for all of the variables were less than 5.0 suggesting that multicollinearity was not problematic in these regression equations. [ Table 6 about here]
An inspection of the co-efficients on the PC variables indicates that only one significant value is observed. The Creditor Rights variable (PC4) 
Common and Civil Law Traditions and Corporate Law
Reference to the work of Berle and Means is a recurring theme in a number of the La Porta et al papers (see, especially, La Porta et al. 1999) . That theme is the need to reappraise a common image of corporate structures, stemming from Berle and Means classic analysis, which focuses on the agency conflict between ownership and control.
They state that "Our results present a different picture of the ownership structure of a modern corporation than that suggested by Berle and Means and widely accepted in the finance literature." (La Porta et al., 1999, p. 502) . And La Porta et al (2008) state that:
"The last decade has witnessed an explosion of research on corporate governance that uses the investor protection framework. This research has successfully replaced the traditional Berle-Means conception of a public corporation with a much more realistic for most of the world model of family-run firms, pyramidal and group structures, and tremendous conflicts between outside investors and controlling shareholders. (p. 287).
However there is another, more fundamental, insight of Berle and Means on which La
Porta et al appear to be silent, and which is an explicit critique of the common law tradition and its implications for corporate governance. That analysis, we will argue, is consistent with an expectation that societal well being will be better in civil law rather than common law countries.
In their discussion of "The traditional logic of property", Berle and Means (1932, Book Four, Chapter 1), refer to legal, economic and social issues "which must now be squarely faced". The most important issue that they identify is "who should receive the profits of industry", in other words, should large companies be run in the interests of the "owners" or others? Berle and Means place quotation marks around the word "owners" to indicate the problematic issue of identifying the meaning of, and the rights attaching to, ownership of large and publicly important enterprises. They assert that under common law, the traditional logic of property requires that the entire profit be awarded to the shareholders. They discuss the historical development of the law pertaining to property when power to manage assets was delegated to others. The dominant tradition is that those with delegated rights to control assets owned by others do so as fiduciaries. They follow their examination of such developments by stating "Underlying all this is the ancient preoccupation of the common law with the rights of property. Primarily, the common law did not undertake to set up ideal schemes of government. It aimed to protect men in their own." (Berle and Means, 1932, p.296) .
This legal tradition is subjected to a critical reappraisal by Berle and Means. In this exercise they address fundamental questions arising from the separation of ownership and control. However their interest in this question was not confined to the classic agency problem with which they are closely associated -they were much more concerned with the significance for wider society of the operation of large corporations.
They reason that the nature of the modern corporation "calls for analysis, not in terms of business enterprise but in terms of social organization" because the corporation has become a site of highly centralized power in which many interests are at stake.
Their discussion then centres on the historical process by which power is challengedas happened in relation to the absolute religious power once wielded by the church, and the slow process by which constitutional law developed in the political context.
Berle and Means do not predict how this essentially political question, of how the diverse groups which have an interest in the operation of the corporation will resolve their interests; but they do take a normative, as well as an analytic perspective in considering future possibilities.
They consider that the owners of passive property, having given up the role of managing their resources, have also given up the right to have the entity operated in their interest 15 . But they are also emphatic that the elimination of the "sole interest of the passive owner" does not mean that the controlling group should take over the same right: they conclude that neither "the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand against the paramount interests of the community". They recognize that institutional and political accommodations will need to be fashioned, but hold that:
"When a convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is generally accepted, in that moment the passive property right of today must yield before the larger interests of society." (p.312).
They envisage courts having to moderate their traditional position on property rights by whichever "legal theories they might choose" to recognize what Berle and Means see as a social imperative. They base this imperative on a continuing historical process whereby concentrated power is forced to accede to the wider interests of the polity. (see also Engelen, 2002 and Gomez and Korine, 2005) . They argue that:
"It is conceivable, -indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate system is to survive, -that the "control" of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity". (p.313).
16
They go on to reiterate the point about the historical imperative whereby power is and should be challenged whenever it becomes too concentrated -and with great prescience they foresee the potential for corporations to become so powerful that they can dominate the state. This reinforces their central point that the control of such organisations should become a matter of constitutional reform in the wider democratic and public interest, rather than a vehicle for promoting the interest of powerful groups.
Their views of the differing characteristics of a legal framework which aims to balance the interests of all members of society, and the common law which merely seeks to defend "men in their own" are, we submit, of great salience given the evidence adduced in this paper of the wider societal impacts which are associated with legal traditions.
Conclusion
Our conclusion to this paper can be stated succinctly. Following the thrust of the Berle and Means analysis we contend that the common law tradition leads to the spurious depoliticisation of issues that are central to political mediation. And we have adduced evidence that it leads to social outcomes, relative to those found in countries with a civil law tradition, which should give profound cause for concern and prompt the question of how such outcomes could be ameliorated. And in this context, we believe that the wide influence of the work of La Porta et al. is a matter for concern.
Shleifer (2002) asserts that:
"The evidence identifies no benefits of the more interventionist institutions [of civil law countries] for economic or social outcomes. To the contrary, French legal origin typically is associated with worse public sector outcomes" (p.3).
And, perhaps even more worryingly that "In the years ahead, institutional reform may become one of the key strategies for improving human welfare." (p.5)
We also note that much of the analysis and evidence, produced by La Porta et al., on the relationship between varieties of capitalism, including legal traditions and related forms of corporate governance, is of great significance and potential importance.
Unfortunately their "narrow view", which may have appeal to some investors, has obscured the really important implications of their work for wider society. 
